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Abstract. Successful implementation of build-operate-transfer (BOT), infrastructure projects is dependent on a full and 
thorough analysis of factors that include social, economic and political, amongst others. Alongside the financially focused 
evaluations, qualitative factors will also have a strong impact on the project and so require specific techniques for the 
analysis. This paper presents a new evaluation framework, based on the analytical hierarchy process technique, for use in 
assessing the most common and significant decision factors relating to risks in BOT projects. Consultations with an expert 
group identified a series of risk decision factors. The results produced twenty-eight critical Risk Factors, which have a 
particular impact on the risks of BOT projects. The project risk framework was constructed by classifying the factors into 
five categories. The framework was successfully validated using a BOT project case study. This research seeks to make a 
valuable contribution to the field by having developed and validated a new risk evaluation framework, focused on BOT 
projects in Kuwait. 
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Introduction 
The worldwide need for development projects is increas-
ing continuously, particularly regarding all forms of in-
frastructure facilities. An imbalance in the infrastructure 
projects and the ability of countries to meet their devel-
opment requirements has been caused by population 
growth and the immense, rapid expansion of global eco-
nomics. The movement towards privatization, both in 
developed and developing countries has resulted in the 
participation of the private sector in the improvement of 
the infrastructure process as a more popular option. This 
gradually led to the demise of the monopoly held by the 
public sector, regarding basic infrastructure facilities.  
As a result of the reduction in public funding, go-
vernments are becoming increasingly dependent on the 
private sector for the improvement and development of 
infrastructure projects. This is due to the fact that the 
private sector is often better equipped in the following 
ways: the mobilization of resources; the provision of 
technical and managerial expertise; an improved opera-
ting efficiency; the potential for large-scale injection of 
capital; a greater efficiency in using the capital; utiliza-
tion of rationalization/cost-base tariffs for services; and a 
better understanding of customer needs.  
Due to the number of parties involved and the cor-
responding amount of interlocking contracts required, 
BOT projects are indisputably complex. In this type of 
project, each party has to rely on the performance of its 
counterpart, and is also dependent on the lead time of 
each stage of the project, which can be lengthy. Further-
more, there are high associated upfront costs. There are 
also a number of complex issues, i.e. government stabili-
ty, which have to be resolved, specifically with respect to 
developing countries.  
As a result of large capital outlays and the long ti-
mescales required to generate returns for investors, BOT 
infrastructure projects carry an inherent risk. There is an 
increased probability of problems arising when such long 
timescales are involved. The relative amount of loss 
could potentially be huge, given the very large capital 
outlays required. Therefore, the decision to invest in BOT 
projects is affected, to a large extent, by the perception of 
risk.  
The purpose behind the Kuwaiti governments pro-
gram of privatization is essentially to ease the financial 
burden on the public by reducing the costs connected 
with public debt. It also assists in the transition of the 
central economy from a planned to a free market and in 
many cases results in an improvement in public services. 
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It involves a partnership between the public and private 
sectors, which is essentially a service contract in which 
the private sector plans the funding of the project and 
provides the assets required to deliver it, while the public 
sector selects and purchases the necessary services it 
provides a suitable opportunity to provide high-quality 
services which are fully equipped and well insulated, 
using private sector funding, with the risk factors passing 
from the public to the private sector and avoids the need 
of the public sector to purchase capital assets. 
In order to study the impact on the economy of the 
general privatization process, it is possible to measure the 
percentage increase in the amount of private sector parti-
cipation within the economy, the improvement in the 
trade balance, the growth in the domestic capital markets, 
decrease in the budget deficit, reduction in unemploy-
ment levels, as well as the financial, quality of service 
and profitability indicators. 
The Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment contract in 
Kuwait, signed in May 2001, was commissioned in 2004 
and currently processes 50 million gallons of water per 
day for irrigation purposes. It is the largest BOT project 
to date and revenues were projected of USD 390 million 
over 10 years. Privately owned Kuwaiti companies have 
launched projects in real estate and one of these, the 
Kuwaiti National Real Estate Company completed the 
USD 132 million Sharq Mall in 1998. In 2002 the Marina 
Mall, a USD 162 million BOT, was completed by the 
Kuwaiti United Realty Company. More recently, in Feb-
ruary 2010, the Kuwaiti Government approved a major 
development plan consisting of 1,100 projects totalling 
KD 30.8 (USD 107.8 billion). The projects include a free 
trade zone with 700,000 residents, a planned financial 
and commercial hub and the creation of a Silk City pro-
gram all of which, according to the Minister of State for 
Housing and Development Affairs, are intended to be 
undertaken as BOT projects. 
There are several disadvantages to the privatization 
process, which include a lack of expertise, insufficient 
legislative cover, a lack of regulations covering the rela-
tionship between the participating parties, which would 
protect their rights and ensure compliance with the details 
of the contract. The State authorities expended a great 
deal of effort in order to achieve satisfactory results.  
However, while bidding for BOT projects, some in-
vestors submitted high offers, without realistically conside-
ring the risks and opportunities involved. Also, many of 
the methods were not transparent as the main concern of 
investors was to earn extra profit and guarantee beneficial 
financial results. As a result, legal and contractual issues 
have been raised, with a negative effect on the projects and 
a lack of confidence and increasing tension between the 
parties involved in the contract. The experience gained has 
had advantages as well as disadvantages, but the problems 
have been emphasized for political reasons, so it was ne-
cessary for the government to pay special attention to 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). This indicates the serious 
intention of the government to implement privatization 
policy and to involve the private sector in the execution 
and development of projects and services. 
Some articles within the legislation may have pre-
vented investors from participating in certain projects and 
public opinion is also an important factor to consider. 
These issues have resulted from the new BOT law and 
also the economic boom, which occurred during the reco-
very period over the last five years. Even though only 
three years have passed since the enactment of the law 
and decree, critics are still requesting amendments to the 
law. This in fact occurred even before there was an 
awareness of the unknown risks involved. The crisis of 
confidence between the public and private sectors is still 
in existence and so the causes need to be addressed so 
that all parties will benefit from the legislation and so that 
it can lead to successful projects resulting in improved 
development for the whole country. 
Unfortunately, due to the extended process of procu-
rement in Kuwait, many accusations of attempted bribery 
and inducements have been leveled at bidders. Several 
investigations and trials are currently in process, which 
involve accusations against current or previous govern-
ment officials. Since the end of the Gulf War, however, 
there have been no convictions for bribery 
Law No. 25 was passed in 1996, in which all  
companies securing contracts worth KD 100,000 
(USD 364,931) or more must report all payments made to 
Kuwaiti agents or advisors during the time of securing the 
contract. In the same way, individuals in Kuwait should 
report any compensation payments received when secu-
ring government contracts. 
In 2010, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) discovered Kuwait to be 54th out 
of 180 countries. Within the Arab region, it was ranked 
seventh out of 18 countries. According to Transparency 
International, Kuwait’s CPI score of 4.5 (out of 10) indi-
cates that it suffers from a “serious corruption problem”. 
According to the World Bank (1994), it is widely 
accepted by virtually all governments that one of the most 
important factors in encouraging national economic 
growth is having an appropriate and reliable infrastructu-
re. Even though economists find it hard to agree about the 
elasticity of infrastructure investment, studies have shown 
that infrastructure is extremely important to successful 
economic activity. 
However, it is often the case that governments in 
countries with developing economies rarely have the 
financial resources needed either to create new, or main-
tain current, infrastructure facilities. Unfortunately, inef-
ficiency and a lack of openness in management dealings 
and decisions, has resulted in a low standard of service to 
the community development for the whole country. 
It is inevitable that risks are a crucial part of BOT 
projects. These risks are quite complicated because of the 
high levels of investment, the length and complex nature 
of the project setup, which is required when all of these 
risks are combined. The companies involved in the BOT 
projects assume responsibility for a wide range of risks 
throughout the life-cycle of the project, while the private 
sector assumes responsibility for the finance, design, 
construction and operating risks. This paper examines 
and discusses the risks faced in BOT projects in the State 
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of Kuwait, prioritizing them, and suggesting a framework 
to manage the risks in the Kuwaiti environment. 
 
1. Background 
The previous tradition, in which government funds infra-
structure developments, has been changing Shen et al. 
(2007). More recently, private businesses have been giv-
en opportunities for involvement in the funding and de-
velopment of infrastructure. The reason for this is that 
private businesses have access to large amounts of capital 
and often have greater management expertise than the 
government. The lack of financial resources is particular-
ly relevant in developing countries, Shen et al. (2007). 
According to Shen et al. (2002), the build-operate-
transfer (BOT), contractual arrangement enables govern-
ments to build more infrastructure services by using pri-
vate finance and management skills, rather than public 
funds. The BOT concept has contributed to the develop-
ment of infrastructure works worldwide, most noticeably 
in developing countries, Shen et al. (2007). This method 
mobilizes private funds and also utilizes the available 
new technology, management skills, and operational 
efficiencies which private businesses are able to provide 
in the development of infrastructure Shen et al. (2007). In 
Southeast Asia, in particular, according to Shen et al. 
(1996), governments have been increasingly using BOT 
methods to build railways, highways, tunnels, ports, brid-
ges, reservoirs, power plants and hydraulic facilities. 
According to Levy (1996), the first BOT contract 
project in modern times dates back to the building of the 
Suez Canal, built in 1854. For this project, the company, 
Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, re-
ceived a concession from the Egyptian government las-
ting for 99 years, enabling it to construct and operate a 
canal which connected the Mediterranean Sea to the Red 
Seas. However, as noted by Huang (1995), the method 
was still rarely used until the mid-1980’s but since then 
the use of the BOT method has increased considerably, 
making a significant contribution to the development of 
worldwide infrastructure.  
Delmon (2000) carried out a study in which he 
found that there are significant risks involved in achie-
ving the objectives for a BOT project and they come from 
various sources, such as: the economic environment, the 
capital budget, the construction cost and time, the opera-
tional costs, as well as the politics and policies prevalent 
at the time. Current market conditions and cooperation 
credibility also play an important role. Both the private 
sector and the government therefore need to pay particu-
lar attention to the effect of these risks before becoming 
involved in a BOT contract. 
A hydropower plant project in Turkey was conside-
red by (Ozdoganm, Birgonul 2000), in order to discover 
the viability of qualitative decision factors, using a check-
list approach. To achieve this, they used three criteria, 
which were government actions (Gas), country specific 
(CS) and project specific (PS). As these were quite su-
bjective criteria, it was impossible to discover the precise 
influence of the qualitative decision factors on the feasi-
bility of the project. Using their checklist approach could 
result in the neglect of possible strategies which might 
have improved certain qualitative aspects of a project 
decision.  
A desirability model, which measures the competi-
tiveness of a company and the attractiveness of a project, 
from a private promoter’s point of view, was provided by 
Dias, Ioannou (1995b), who analyzed a set of country and 
project decision factors and produced a project attractive-
ness index. However, the difficulty with the application 
of this method, in practice, is that it would take quite a 
large amount of time and increase the cost of a project 
feasibility study. It might also result in the misinterpreta-
tion of project decision factors and some of them might 
actually be missed. In the desirability model, the attribute 
worth score was only valid when the attribute performan-
ce was between two extreme values P1 and P2. Where, 
P1 is the minimum plausible performance level for an 
attribute and would indicate the highest point on the per-
formance scale where an attribute is worth its minimum 
(i.e. 0 worth points). The maximum plausible performan-
ce level, P2, indicates the lowest point on the performan-
ce scale and occurs where an attribute value is at its 
maximum (i.e. 100 worth points). 
The different variables, which affect the concession 
period of a BOT contract, were reviewed by Shen et al. 
(2002), who suggested that, in order to determine a sui-
table time period for the project, taking into account both 
the government’s and the investor’s interests, a 
quantitative concession model (BOTCcM), should be 
considered. Shen et al. (2005), in their investigations 
discovered that the risks involved in the implementation 
of a BOT project, had a marked effect on the cash flow 
for the project. Using Monte Carlo simulations, they in-
corporated project risks into the BOTCcM. However, in a 
BOTCcM, all BOT factors other than the concession 
period are predetermined, so it does not allow for diffe-
rent combinations of the concession period with other 
BOT financial variables. 
 
1.1. Nature of infrastructure projects 
Recently, the attention given to urban regeneration pro-
jects has significantly increased. Such initiatives use re-
development projects to resolve the social and economic 
problems caused by antiquated buildings and degraded 
infrastructure, Kim (2010). However, common infrastruc-
ture projects such as power, water and sewerage, tele-
communications and transport facilities possess a number 
of characteristics: they lack portability, are rarely con-
vertible to other uses and it can be difficult to reverse any 
investment made in them. The majority of infrastructure 
projects require large investment capital, are single-asset 
investments and developed over a long period of time; 
they also have long periods of payback. However, they do 
provide important services, which would usually fall to 
the public sector and they generally operate as monopo-
lies. The nature of infrastructure projects makes them 
responsive to public opinion and political pressure. Con-
trary to other types of foreign direct investment, most 
infrastructure projects only generate local currency, but 
the dividends and loan repayments are paid in foreign 
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currency. The process of building infrastructure facilities 
is also complex and very risky. 
 
2. Definition of BOT approach  
BOT is a term used for the financial involvement of the 
private sector in various infrastructure projects. BOT 
should not be thought of as a legal term, but rather as an 
economic and financial concept. As defined by Tiong 
(1995a), it is “the granting of a concession by the Gov-
ernment to a private promoter, known as the concession-
aire, who is responsible for financing, construction, oper-
ation and maintenance of a facility over the concession 
period before finally transferring the fully operational 
facility to the Government at no cost”.  
There are several different definitions of BOT: 
− Tiong (1995c) states that it is a method of project fi-
nancing in which a government awards a concession 
to a group of investors, known as the “Project Con-
sortium” for the development, operation, manage-
ment, and commercial exploitation of a particular 
project; 
− According to Esq (1996), BOT is a method of fi-
nancing a project in which the government grants a 
concession to a private entity or project company to 
build and operate a project, which would usually be 
operated by the government itself;  
− Nassar (1996) defines BOT as the involvement of 
Concession Company which provides the finance 
for, and then designs, constructs, operates, and 
maintains a particular infrastructure project for a 
pre-defined length of time, after which it is trans-
ferred back to the host government without any 
charge. 
In any BOT scheme the concession company finan-
ces, designs, constructs, operates and maintains a particu-
lar facility for a fixed period of time, which should be 
long enough to pay off all debts and provide a reasonable 
profit to the equity investors. At the end of the specified 
time, the facility passes, without charge, to the public 
authority or the government (Walker, Smith 1995; 
Wilburn, Thomas 1994). The BOT model is a method 
in which a group of private investors form a consor-
tium to complete an infrastructure project including its 
design, finance and construction. It then operates the 
project for a period of time on behalf of the promoter 
(which may be the government). This is known as a 
franchise/concession and involves the building and 
operation of the project for a length of time before it is 
passed back to the host authority (Shen et al. 2002; 
Askar, Gab-Allah 2002). 
 
2.1. Risk in BOT projects 
One of the main methods for procuring and delivering 
public infrastructure projects is the public–private part-
nership (PPP), and, according to Regan et al. (2009), it 
has been used in over 85 countries. Its specific features 
include improved public facilities and services, a compet-
itive bidding process, and a suitable balance of project 
risks, together with the innovation and expertise of the 
private sector.  
The National Council for Public–Private Partne-
rships, USA (2009), have defined a public–private partne-
rship as “a contractual agreement between a public agen-
cy – federal, state, or local – and a private sector entity”, 
in which a sharing of the assets and skills of each sector 
results in the provision of a public service or facility for 
the use of the general public. According to Li et al. 
(2005), it is considered to deliver value for money in the 
provision of public services and infrastructure by combi-
ning the advantages of flexible negotiation and competi-
tive tendering and by allocating risk, on an agreed basis, 
between the public and private sectors.  
According to Kumaraswamy, Morris (2002), BOT 
schemes may be either private participation (PP), or pub-
lic–private partnerships (PPPs). Other collective terms are: 
build and transfer (BT), build, transfer, and operate (BTO), 
build, operate and own (BOO), build, operate, own, and 
transfer (BOOT), operate and transfer (OT), reconstruct, 
operate, and transfer (ROT), etc. all of which are subject to 
concession agreements. As Tiong (1995a) states, a BOT 
infrastructure project may be implemented by a govern-
ment grant, with a concession company which will finance, 
construct, operate and maintain the project before transfer-
ring ownership back to the government after an agreed 
concession period. Senturk et al. (2004), note that BOT 
schemes, as adopted in many industrialized countries, use 
private sector participation to finance new infrastructure 
projects. A number of studies (Tiong 1990; Dias, Ioannou 
1995b; Liddle 1997) show that government-sponsored 
BOT schemes encourage the participation of the private 
sector in large public infrastructure projects such as roads, 
expressways, bridges, railways, ports and power plants, 
which are built and/or operated by private firms under a 
procurement system. However, there is much risk attached 
to the process and this must be carefully evaluated by both 
the private bidders and the public client, throughout the 
whole duration of the project. An effective management 
framework needs to be set up to deal with the risk on a 
theoretical and practical basis. 
There is risk involved throughout the life of the pro-
ject and, as BOT-type projects require large investments 
and cover long time periods, as Shen et al. (2005) state, 
during the concession period, these many risks and uncer-
tainties could potentially affect the performance of the 
project. 
The BOT projects undertaken by the private sector 
contain many risks and uncertainties (Songer et al. 1997). 
The BOT projects are generally large-scale projects pro-
viding infrastructure facilities and the transaction costs on 
average are between 5 and 10% of the overall project cost 
(Klein et al. 1996). 
Projects involving the building of infrastructure ha-
ve a higher risk element because the capital costs are 
usually high, there is often a long lead-time and the resul-
ting assets do not usually have any alternative use. It is 
very important, therefore, to identify, analyze and alloca-
te the different risks when evaluating privately promoted 
infrastructure projects. The risks involved in BOT pro-
Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 2014, 20(3):  415–433 
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jects are two-fold. First, there are the risks involved in the 
start-up procedure (financial and technical studies) and 
also finance and operational risks due to the nature of the 
BOT approach; and secondly, being large-scale projects, 
there are also regulatory, political and economic risks 
involved (Ebrahimnejad et al. 2010). 
According to Tiong, Alum (1997) due to the high 
level of risk associated with BOT projects, the negotiators 
and Decision Makers (DMs), for both the public and 
private sectors need to carry out a careful analysis and 
then manage these risks. However, as pointed out by 
Ozdogann, Birgonul (2000) the private sector and the 
government do not share a set of principles covering the 
risks associated with BOT projects, and so, according to 
Tiong (1995c), the promoter who wins the concession is 
more likely to be the one who carries the risk and offers 
suitable guarantees. According to Gunn (2005), risks and 
ambiguity will be present in all construction projects 
and tend to involve the three main project manage-
ment restrictions of time, quality and budget. The 
many risks involved in construction are considerably 
increased in BOT projects, due to the complex combina-
tion of various issues such as design, construction, opera-
tion and finance. The risks themselves are more 
complex than for conventional projects because of the 
higher number of parties and agreements concerned. 
The working environment is very different in BOT pro-
jects and so both the private and public sectors need a 
change in attitude towards the risks involved. Govern-
ments usually attempt to transfer as much risk as possible 
to the private sector, while the private sector is asked to 
assume that risks inherent to the project are assigned to 
the appropriate party. 
Public–Private Partnership (PPP) is a procurement 
approach where the public and private sector join forces 
to provide a public service or facility. In this agreement, 
usually both the public and private sector will contribute 
their expertise and resources to the project and share the 
risks involved, (Cheung et al. 2010). The Public–Private 
Partnership (PPP) projects fall into two main groups, 
consisting of general and project risks (Loosemore 2007; 
Loosemore et al. 2006). The risks within a BOT project 
will change during the development process, and so 
they will change at each stage, from the planning 
phase through to the design, construction and opera-
tion phases. 
There are six areas of risk associated with PPP pro-
jects, according to Grimsey and Lewis (2004), and these 
are: financial, asset, sponsor, operating, public and default 
risks. The main categories of risk in BOT projects have 
been identified (Dey et al. 2002) as economic, political, 
legal, construction, financial and operating risks. Accor-
ding to (Baloi, Price 2003), the risks also need to be cate-
gorized as: static/dynamic, individual/corporate, inter-
nal/external, positive/negative, acceptable/objectionable 
and insurable/uninsurable. For this reason, government 
assurance is extremely important in BOT projects. The 
more easily observed risks are: economic, political, finan-
cial and related risks.  
 
2.2. Risk management in BOT projects 
Risk management is an “activity that defines sources of 
uncertainty (risk identification), estimating the conse-
quences of uncertain events/conditions (risk analysis), 
generating response strategies in the light of expected out-
comes and finally, based on the feedback received on actu-
al outcomes and risks emerged, carrying out identification, 
analysis and response generation steps repetitively 
throughout the life cycle of an object to ensure that the 
project objectives are met” (Zavadskas et al. 2010). Ac-
cording to Gunn (2005), the importance of risk manage-
ment to the success of BOT projects cannot be overesti-
mated. There are many different types of risk and 
uncertainty involved in every construction project, howev-
er small. These may be: technical, economic, legal, etc. but 
they all ultimately involve an organization in financial risk. 
The risks pertaining to BOT projects are more complicated 
than the traditional methods, where the design is separate 
from the construction and the client is responsible for the 
project. This is not only due to the long duration, high 
investment and complicated methods of procurement, but 
also because all of these risks are combined, with the com-
panies involved in the project assuming responsibility for a 
whole range of risks within the life-cycle of the project and 
the private sector taking responsibility for financial, design, 
construction and operating risks. The three main areas of 
risk generally center on the project management con-
straints of time, quality and budget.  
Dey and Ogunlana (2004) consider that ineffective 
risk management is one of the major causes of failure of 
BOT projects, which are considered to be the most risky 
project schemes. An understanding of the contents and 
contexts of BOT projects is extremely important today, as 
are the risk-management tools and techniques available. 
The application of these tools will depend on various 
factors including the policy requirements of the organiza-
tion, the project management strategy, the nature of the 
project, the attitude of the project team to risk taking and 
the availability of resources.  
Raz, Michael (2001) commented that risk manage-
ment has been a main topic of interest for researchers and 
practitioners who are involved in project management. 
Flanagan, Norman (1993) have defined risk management 
as a system which aims to identify and quantify all risks 
to which a business or project is exposed so that a cons-
cious decision can be taken on how to manage those 
risks. Risk management acknowledges the possibility that 
future events may produce negative or adverse effects 
and employs the design and implementation of systems or 
procedures which will control these risks. This definition 
also explains that the purpose of risk management is to 
manage systems in order to control risks. 
Although risk management need not be very comp-
licated or involve data collection on a large scale, it 
should be cost effective, practical and, of course, realistic. 
Often, in addition to analysis, judgment and experience, it 
is based on common sense, intuition and ‘gut feeling’ but, 
most of all, there needs to be a willingness to adopt a 
disciplined approach. Depending on the circumstances 
involved in each project, there will be different degrees of 
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analysis. It is therefore important to formulate a structu-
red risk-analysis system. 
Experience shows that, the identification and classi-
fication of risks is more difficult than actually controlling 
them. Decision-makers therefore need to identify the risk 
and plan a risk-management system, otherwise they will 
lose control of the system and fail to find solutions to the 
risk or solve any of the problems within the system.  
Ghosh and Jintanapakanont (2004) suggest that risk 
management is a tool for managing projects effectively 
throughout their lifecycles.  
Due to the uncertain nature of risks, decision makers 
need to consider which specific risks need to be analyzed 
and then devise strategies to deal with them. Although 
risk management will not remove every risk from the 
project, it is intended to identify them early on so that 
their relative importance can be assessed and recommen-
dations made on how best to control them in order to 
provide the best outcome for the project.  
 
3. Research methodology 
The most important task of risk management is to analyze 
the risk so that appropriate decisions can be taken. Ah-
med et al. (2007), Zayed and Chang (2002) have cited 
Dias, Ioannou (1995b), as providing a proposal for both a 
qualitative and quantitative approach to risk analysis. A 
risk index is derived using the main risk categories within 
a concession-type agreement. These are then rated using a 
scaled value. The first stage in this paper is to specify the 
different variables, (numerical and linguistic), which 
would affect the project risk. This can be achieved by 
gathering all the related variables from the database of 
previous projects and the project environment, (e.g. con-
ditions in the host country, the characteristics of the pro-
ject and its location). The BOT project risk factors can be 
selected by evaluating a wide range of risk factors and 
their sub-factors can be obtained from the literature 
(Tiong 1990, 1995a, b, 1996; Tiong et al. 1992; Levy 
1996; UNIDO 1996; Gupta, Narasimham 1998; Rana-
singhe 1999; Ozdoganm, Birgonul 2000). The second 
stage is to identify the variables and classify them after 
removing the redundant ones. The risk factors can be 
grouped within the main categories in order to reduce 
extensive effort and save time in determining their inter-
relationships and evaluation. This should be carried out 
by a group of experts in the field. The third stage is to 
apply mathematical methods used for processing the data. 
In this study, the methodology adopted will determine the 
most common and important risk factors (variables), 
affecting the risk of BOT infrastructure projects in Ku-
wait and, to then to discover the extent to which they can 
be controlled. A set of linguistic variables are categorized 
according to their relevance. The flow chart in Figure 1 
demonstrates the methodology used in this study. The 
absolute of project decision risk analysis is the “risk in-
dex” V(x), which assesses the risk of the project. This a 
non- dimensional risk measure shown in Eqn (1) below: 
   
1
( ) ( )i i i
n
i
V x w v x
=
= −∑ . (1)  
Dias and Ioannou (1995a) considered the value 
function as a function used to transform an outcome (i.e. 
the performance level of an attribute) into the decision-
maker’s relative worth for this outcome. Transforming an 
attribute performance level to its “worth” score, by means 
of a “value” function, is more complicated than estima-
ting the performance (quality), level of an attribute direct-
ly through the use of a quantitative scale. It was very 
difficult to choose appropriate quantitative constructs to 
represent the model attributes, so a qualitative scale, 
common to all attributes, was considered to be the best 
alternative for the development of the model. The 
“worth” score of an attribute, Vi (xi), is a non-dimensional 
number representing the performance level for a specific 
project. In order to calculate the worth score of an attribu-
te, its performance level must be qualitatively assessed, 
and then the value function used to transform the subjec-
tivity assessment into a numerical scale. 
 
Questionnaire and expert criteria 
The project risk attributes include a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative factors and, in order to deter-
mine their inter-relationships, it is necessary to assign 
“weights” to the performance (quality), levels for each 
attribute contributing to the project risk and to compare 
their relative importance. To carry out this important 
process it is necessary to gather the required information 
from experienced professionals in the industry, who are 
especially involved in the development of BOT projects. 
For this research, the selection of the professional group 
of respondents was based on the following criteria: 
− The expert should be involved in developing one of 
the BOT projects;  
− The expert should be one from the top project man-
agement team; 
− A whole variety of project-type experience must be 
considered; 
− Experts, (public or private agencies or financiers), 
were selected from diverse project participants to re-
flect the likely differences in opinions of project 
participants concerning the risk of potential projects 
and the degree of importance of differing project at-
tributes. 
A BOT project risk framework is an evaluation 
framework that is multi-attributed and it was developed 
with information gathered from two self-administered 
questionnaires, which were distributed with Kuwait. The 
first questionnaire was designed to assess the common 
risk factors, found in the literature, which affect the BOT 
project system. The first questionnaire included 80 fac-
tors compiled from previous studies. These were grouped 
together under the name of the corresponding risk factors. 
Experts ranked the common BOT risks factors according 
to their relevance in each of the project categories. These 
same experts were also asked to add further attributes 
which they considered necessary to reinforce the quality




Fig. 1. Study methodology flow chart 
 
of the framework, (although no additional attributes were 
actually identified in this method). The information ga-
thered from the first questionnaire was refined, compiled 
and screened by using mean average and standard devia-
tion and it resulted in five Risk Categories with their 
related twenty-eight Risk Factors which were used to 
form a hierarchical structure of the framework shown in 
Figure 2. Included in the second questionnaire was the 
hierarchical structure of the framework, which was de-
signed to check the relevance of each factor with regard 
to its corresponding category, to assign a weight and 
performance level to each risk factor and also to evaluate 
the case study project holistically. A variety of experts 
were chosen in order to identify and evaluate the most 
common attributes, which would have the most signifi-
cant impact on the BOT project risk. The first 
questionnaire was sent to sixteen local Kuwaiti BOT 
experts representing different sectors (financial, legal, 
consultancy and development, university professors, and 
official agencies). Their answers represented their unders-
tanding of the problem. Five were project company ma-
nagers involved in only one BOT project, three were 
project heads of site offices, four were involved in more 
than one BOT project as engineering consultants, two 
academic experts were involved in a number of BOT 
projects as management construction consultants, and two 
were involved in BOT projects as financial consultants. 
The second questionnaire survey was sent to fourteen of 
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the original sixteen local Kuwait experts (two did not 
want any further participation in the survey). These four-
teen respondents returned fully completed surveys and 
also had expressed a willingness to offer more support to 
this study. It is possible that this low sample number 
could be ascribed to the fact that the respondent criteria 
called for very qualified experts in BOT systems who had 
the knowledge and ability to deal with a whole 
complexity of qualitative decision factors and their rela-
tionships. Previous studies have shown that the response 
rates to requests for qualitative factor assessment has 
been very low: for example, in Dias and Ioannou (1995b), 
only twelve and eight respondents had accepted the invi-
tation and completed the questionnaire and in Ahmed 
et al. (2007), only twelve and fifteen respondents had 
accepted the invitation and completed the survey. The 
resulting “inconsistency ratio” of the pairwise compari-
son matrix was <0.1 for answers from every respondent. 
This represents a further encouraging sign of the reliabili-
ty of the responses received. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Hierarchical structure of BOT project risk management framework  
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Table 1. Category pairwise comparison matrix and relative weights 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Category Relative 
Importance 
              
CR versus FR 1 1/9 1/3 6 1 1/3 1/2 1/3 4 5 1 1 1/2 2 
CR versus PP 2 1/7 1/4 9 3 1/3 1/2 1/3 7 5 3 2 7 5 
CR versus DR 2 1/6 1/5 9 1 1/3 2 1/3 7 5 1 1 1/3 7 
CR versus Co 8 1 1/5 9 1 1/5 2 1/5 9 5 1 9 1/3 7 
FR versus PP 7 3 1/2 9 1 1/3 6 1/4 9 3 1 9 9 7 
FR versus DR 4 5 1/3 9 1/3 1/7 5 1 9 3 1/2 2 3 9 
FR versus CO 4 5 1/5 7 2 1/3 3 1/3 5 3 3 5 2 7 
PP versus DR 1/5 1 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1/5 1/6 2 
PP versus CO 1 1 1/5 1 2 1/3 1/2 1/3 1 1/3 1 1/2 1/4 1/3 
DR versus CO 4 1 1/2 1 3 1/2 1/2 1/5 1/3 1/2 3 5 1/2 1/5 
Weights               
CR 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.61 0.25 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.55 0.53 0.24 0.28 0.13 0.44 
FR 0.39 0.51 0.09 0.26 0.17 0.09 0.46 0.12 0.29 0.20 0.21 0.36 0.38 0.37 
PP 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.22 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.06 
DR 0.18 0.15 0.32 0.04 0.29 0.27 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.03 
CO 0.06 0.11 0.43 0.04 0.12 0.38 0.15 0.46 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.25 0.10 
 
3.1. BOT risk model attributes selection 
The first questionnaire assessed the common risk factors, 
which affected the management systems for BOT infra-
structure projects and also ranked the common BOT risk 
factors according to their relevance to each of the project 
categories on a qualitative scale of one to nine points. 
After careful selection of the project risk factor mo-
del attributes, 28 attributes were extracted from the first 
questionnaire. The attributes were identified and classi-
fied under five main risk categories. In order to reduce 
the size of the comparison matrix and also to ensure that 
the comparison attributes were more meaningful, only 
attributes of the same nature were compared and these 
were divided into five categories. This was following the 
assumption made by Miller (1956), that the brain could 
simultaneously process 7±2 items. 
 
3.2. BOT project risk attributes relative weights 
From the responses obtained, pairwise comparison matri-
ces of the project risk model were constructed, which 
represented their relative importance, based on a numeri-
cal scale of 1–9. By means of the Eigenvalue Method 
(EM) in the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) the 
categories and their local weight attributes were calculat-
ed using the computer software package “Expert Choice 
11” which is a computer application of the AHP tech-
nique. The input data included the formatted risk frame-
work categories and attributes as a hierarchical structure 
with all the given relationships shown, as well as the 
pairwise comparison matrix values for each participant. 
Expert Choice 11 was used to find the inconsistency ratio 
of each matrix. For each respondent, the software output 
shows the inconsistency ratio for each comparison matrix 
and the local importance weight for each decision factor 
(alternative), within the category (objective), and the 
importance of the composite weight of each factor to the 
total project risk (goal). 
3.3. Category weights 
The project risk attributes were classified within five 
main categories as shown in Figure 2. The individual 
results provided by participants, for comparison of the 
relative importance of the different categories, and the 
calculated category weights, are presented in Table 1. 
The results indicate that 35.7% of the responses su-
ggested that the “Financial & Revenue” risk category is 
the most important one (superior), within the project risk 
decision, while 28.5% find the “Country Risks” category 
to be the most important, ranking it second in the list. A 
further 21.5% thought that “Construction & Operating” 
risk was the most important category, while 14.3% found 
“Development Risk” to be the most important category. 
“Promoting & Procurement” risks came out as the least 
important of all. Taking average weights for the five ca-
tegories, indicates that “Financial & Revenue” risks carry 
28% of the total project risk, while “Country Risks” 
follow closely with 27%, “Construction & Operating” 
risk carries 18%, “Development Risk” has 17% and 
“Promoting & Procurement” risk has 10% of the total. 
From this it can be concluded that the “Financial & 
Revenue” risks category is the most important, being 
slightly ahead of the “Country Risks” category and about 
twice as significant as the “Construction & Operating” 
risk and “Development Risk” categories. It thus follows 
that the decision-maker needs to give the highest priority 
to “Financial & Revenue” risks and “Country Risk” fac-
tors when carrying out an assessment for project risks in 
Kuwait. 
In order to calculate the contribution weight of each 
category to the total project risk, the overall weight of 
individual responses (the group weight) for each category 
is required. A geometrical, rather than the arithmetic, 
mean of responses was used to group the individual 
judgments for each category, because, according to Saaty 
and Aczel (1983), the method used to consolidate indivi-
dual judgments, needs to preserve the reciprocal nature of 
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the comparison matrix. From Table 2 it can be seen that 
the group weights of categories are approximately similar 
to the average of the local weight. It is apparent that the 
“Financial & Revenue” risks category has the highest 
weight of 31.1%, followed by “Country” risks, which 
have 23.4% and the “Promoting & Procurement” risks 
category, which has the lowest weight of about 10%. 
 
Table 2. Category group pairwise comparison and group rela-
tive weights 
Category Comparison Relative Importance  (Geo-mean) 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) vs  
Financial & Revenue Risks 0.90 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) vs 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 1.61 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) vs 
Development Risk 1.19 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) vs  
Construction & Operating Risk 1.65 
Financial & Revenue Risks vs   
Promoting & Procurement Risks 2.62 
Financial & Revenue Risks vs  
Development Risk 1.94 
Financial & Revenue Risks vs   
Construction & Operating Risk 2.19 
Promoting & Procurement Risks vs  
Development Risk 0.60 
Promoting & Procurement Risks vs 
Construction & Operating Risk 0.56 
Development Risk vs Construction & 
Operating Risk 0.83 
Category group weights  
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory)  0.234 
Financial & Revenue Risks 0.311 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 0.114 
Development Risk 0.170 
Construction & Operating Risk 0.171 
 
3.4. Attribute weights 
The twenty-eight Risk Factors were classified and placed 
within their respective Risk Category: six in the Financial 
& Revenue Risks category, six within the Country Risks 
category, six within the Promoting & Procurement Risks 
category, six under the Construction & Operating Risks 
category and four attributes under the Development Risks 
category. 
The relative importance to the participants of each 
attribute within each category and also the local attribute 
weights are presented in Table 3. Considering the local 
weights of attributes within their categories, it is apparent 
that “Changes in general legislation” will affect the pro-
ject and the regulations in the “Country Risks” category. 
The “failure to raise the necessary finance” will affect the 
“Financial & Revenue” risks category. “Lack of integrity 
during the tendering process” will affect the “Promoting 
& Procurement Risks” category. “Changes in Design” 
during the construction phase will affect the “Develop-
ment Risk” category. These are the most significant deci-
sion factors, which will have the maximum impact on the 
project risk, and therefore should be given a very high 
priority by the decision-maker. 
The group weights of the Risk Factors were calcula-
ted by a similar method to that used for the Risk Category 
group weights, in order to find the contribution of each 
Risk Factor to its risk Category. From the results in Tab-
le 4, it can be seen that the categories with the highest 
weights are as follows. “Changes in General Legislation 
Affecting the Project” in the “Country Risks” category, 
an “Failure to Raise Finance” in the “Financial & Reve-
nue” risks category, a “Lack of Integrity in the Tendering  
Process” in the “Promoting & Procurement Risks” cate-
gory, “Use of Technology” in the “Development Risk” 
category and “Inappropriate Operating Methods” in the 
“Construction & Operating Risk” category. These 
weights are: 0.261, 0.248, 0.305, 0.408 and 0.242 respec-
tively, within their Risk Categories. The weights of the 
attributes within each Risk Category, sum to unity. 
Afterwards, the similarities and differences between 
individual weights were checked and the contributions of 
individual Risk Factors to the project risk were calcula-
ted. In order to do this, it was necessary to determine the 
individual relative weight of each Risk Factor towards the 
total project risk (composite weight “Wi”). The composite 
weight of an attribute is equal to the local weight of that 
attribute “Wi” multiplied by its local category weight 
“Wc”: 
 Wi = W¹*Wc. (2) 
The sum of the composite weights of the attributes must 
equal unity, so: 
 Σ Wi = 1. (3) 
The composite weights of the twenty-eight Risk 
Factors were calculated from Eqn (2) for each contribu-
tion, displayed in Table 5. 
The average composite weight of each Risk Factor 
to within ± standard deviation is given in Figure 3. These 
results show that the “use of technology”, “unavailability 
of power supply” and the “Government’s failure to pro-
vide permits”, have the highest weights of 0.0707, 0.065 
and 0.0636, respectively, with the minimum standard 
deviation. However, a “lack of experience”, “error in 
operation” and “maintenance cost estimates”, as well as 
“lack of commitment to concession contracts” attributes, 




Fig. 3. Average EM composite attribute weights with its 
boundaries of ± standard deviation 
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Table 3. Risk decision factors: local attributes weights 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) 
GI 0.453 0.029 0.037 0.274 0.124 0.026 0.431 0.042 0.484 0.027 0.1 0.152 0.056 0.096 
GFP 0.024 0.093 0.059 0.061 0.347 0.196 0.033 0.059 0.056 0.088 0.378 0.056 0.107 0.057 
NLS 0.078 0.347 0.171 0.334 0.189 0.086 0.135 0.096 0.216 0.416 0.162 0.431 0.134 0.039 
OH 0.116 0.03 0.193 0.028 0.224 0.102 0.153 0.175 0.028 0.089 0.211 0.037 0.261 0.478 
CGL 0.262 0.244 0.159 0.281 0.07 0.187 0.194 0.376 0.187 0.314 0.099 0.278 0.258 0.128 
LCCC 0.067 0.278 0.382 0.026 0.45 0.202 0.053 0.252 0.03 0.066 0.049 0.048 0.184 0.202 
Financial & Revenue Risks 
FRF 0.478 0.056 0.24 0.282 0.294 0.044 0.327 0.041 0.196 0.186 0.28 0.307 0.452 0.564 
UGBE 0.092 0.386 0.206 0.256 0.037 0.073 0.186 0.079 0.216 0.033 0.024 0.093 0.03 0.03 
FRRFP 0.115 0.3 0.084 0.184 0.302 0.077 0.164 0.128 0.215 0.062 0.279 0.096 0.73 0.202 
CIDP 0.154 0.059 0.206 0.175 0.202 0.309 0.234 0.902 0.15 0.1 0.217 0.43 0.248 0.044 
CIEP 0.08 0.099 0.152 0.026 0.12 0.32 0.047 0.124 1.217 0.353 0.105 0.044 0.118 0.6 
EIFDS 0.086 0.1 0.111 0.078 0.045 0.177 0.041 0.226 1.075 0.265 0.095 0.058 0.078 0.1 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 
LOE 0.030 0.074 0.026 0.040 0.029 0.066 0.026 0.058 0.028 0.050 0.196 0.084 0.025 0.113 
LE 0.099 0.162 0.041 0.202 0.083 0.039 0.040 0.115 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.215 0.286 
LIM 0.113 0.200 0.078 0.112 0.119 0.127 0.057 0.088 0.083 0.079 0.037 0.066 0.106 0.045 
CIPS 0.153 0.156 0.206 0.431 0.221 0.225 0.237 0.168 0.135 0.216 0.097 0.078 0.115 0.284 
ELTP 0.117 0.210 0.367 0.094 0.313 0.306 0.226 0.266 0.272 0.274 0.256 0.367 0.122 0.239 
LOI 0.487 0.197 0.281 0.121 0.235 0.237 0.414 0.035 0.445 0.353 0.387 0.375 0.418 0.034 
Development Risks 
EDC 0.046 0.06 0.08 0.333 0.076 0.09 0.065 0.096 0.312 0.042 0.062 0.06 0.167 0.658 
DIDA 0.065 0.493 0.095 0.06 0.083 0.138 0.076 0.169 0.045 0.581 0.057 0.064 0.193 0.083 
UOT 0.368 0.181 0.413 0.274 0.481 0.502 0.401 0.368 0.378 0.218 0.44 0.497 0.047 0.048 
CIDDC 0.521 0.261 0.413 0.333 0.36 0.27 0.458 0.368 0.266 0.159 0.442 0.379 0.593 0.212 
Construction & Operating Risk 
COR 0.232 0.047 0.056 0.233 0.087 0.05 0.278 0.066 0.084 0.042 0.074 0.087 0.112 0.109 
PRR 0.387 0.16 0.122 0.047 0.105 0.056 0.327 0.088 0.089 0.069 0.105 0.192 0.204 0.028 
UOPS 0.033 0.08 0.058 0.152 0.315 0.176 0.032 0.153 0.241 0.07 0.309 0.137 0.066 0.422 
EIO 0.209 0.117 0.243 0.03 0.168 0.116 0.157 0.203 0.271 0.135 0.161 0.171 0.285 0.23 
UPO 0.061 0.11 0.37 0.208 0.144 0.287 0.062 0.297 0.104 0.342 0.199 0.137 0.074 0.143 
IOM 0.078 0.485 0.15 0.33 0.181 0.307 0.144 0.194 0.205 0.342 0.153 0.276 0.26 0.069 
Note:  GI = government instability; GFP = government failure to provide permits; NLS = non-existence of the legal and regulatory 
system; OH = outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism); CGL = changes in general legislation affect the project; 
LCCC = lack of commitment to concession contracts; FRF = Failure to raise finance; UGBE = Undeveloped general business 
environment; FRRFP = Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user); CIDP = Changes in demand of the facility over 
concession period; CIEP = Change in economic policies; EIFDS = Error in forecasting demands for service; LOE = Lack of 
experience; LE = Lack of expertise; LIM = Lack of independent management; CIPS = Changes in project specifications; 
ELTP = Expensive and long tendering process; LOI = Lack of integrity on the tendering process; EDC = Excessive develop-
ment cost; DIDA = Delays in design approval; UOT = Use of technology; CIDDC = Changes in design during construction; 
COR = Cost-overrun risks; PRR = Performance related risk; UOPS = Unavailability of power supply; EIO = Error in opera-
tion and maintenance cost estimate; UPO = Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility; IOM = Inappropri-
ate operating methods. 
 
The respondents recommended that the BOT project 
participants should pay particular attention to the “Count-
ry”, “Construction & Operating” and “Financial” Risk 
categories. However, they also suggested that they need 
to consider all the other model risks, because their 
weights are relatively close. 
The relative importance of an attribute to the total 
project risk is given by its group composite weight. This 
can be found by multiplying the Risk Factor weights 
(Table 4) by the corresponding group Risk Category 
weights (Table 2). 
For example, to find the group composite weight of 
the attribute “Government Instability”, the group weight 
of this attribute must be multiplied by the group weight of 
the “Country” Risk category. Therefore, we find that the 
group composite weight of this attribute is 
0.126 × 0.234 = 0.02945. Table 6 shows the group com-
posite weights of attributes towards the project risk. The 
highest weights of 7.7%, 6.9%, 6.1%, 4.1% and 3.5% 
were allotted to “failure to raise finance”, “use of techno-
logy”, “changes in general legislation” affecting the pro-
ject, “inappropriate operating methods” and “lack of in-
tegrity  on  the t endering  process”  attributes  in  the 
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Table 4. Group weights for comparison of attributes within 
their categories 
Attribute Group Weight 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory)  
Government instability 0.126 
Government failure to provide permits 0.101 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 0.242 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terro-
rism) 0.142 
Changes in general legislation affecting the 
project 0.261 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 0.128 
Financial & Revenue Risks  
Failure to raise finance 0.248 
Undeveloped general business environment 0.103 
Failure to receive revenues from principal end 
user 0.165 
Changes in demand of the facility over conces-
sion period 0.222 
Change in economic policies 0.130 
Error in forecasting demands for service 0.132 
Promoting & Procurement Risks  
Lack of experience 0.056 
Lack of expertise 0.079 
Lack of independent management 0.088 
Changes in project specifications 0.207 
Expensive and long tendering process 0.264 
Lack of integrity in the tendering process 0.305 
Development Risks  
Excessive development cost 0.113 
Delays in design approval 0.115 
Use of technology 0.408 
Changes in design during construction 0.364 
Construction & Operating Risk  
Cost-overrun risks 0.106 
Performance related risk 0.130 
Unavailability of power supply 0.150 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 0.184 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to oper-
ate the facility 0.188 
Inappropriate operating methods 0.242 
 
“Financial”, “Development”, “Country”, “Construction & 
Operating”, and “Promoting & Procurement” categories, 
respectively. 
In Figure 4, the individual range of each attribute 
weight, shown in the form of a column, can be seen. For 
each attribute, the lower part of the column represents the 
minimum importance weights, which were assigned by 
respondents, while the top of the column indicates the 
maximum importance weights. 
The darker line in the middle indicates the group 
composite weight of the attribute, while the dark regions, 
which can be seen above and below the line of group 
composite weights, indicate the standard deviation of the 
individual Group composite Risk Factors with individual 
composite weights, where half of the standard deviation 
is above and the other half is below the line. A table, 
which includes the data displayed in Figure 4, can be 
found in the  Appendix.  A  close  look  at  these  figures 
 
Fig. 4. Group composite attribute weights with range of 
individual composite weights 
 
indicates that three attributes have quite a large range 
between their maximum and minimum importance 
weights. “Changes in the project specifications” attribute 
will have the maximum range of weight difference, with 
reference to the different replies from the respondents, 
(the minimum weight was given by R13 ‘government 
consultant’ and the maximum weight was given by R6 
‘private consultant’). Three attributes have quite a small 
range (i.e. the difference in weight) with the ‘lack of 
experience’ attribute having the smallest, due to the fact 
that respondents have approximately the same view re-
garding the risk weight for the project team experience. 
 
3.5. Attributes worth scores and the framework 
validation approach 
It was Dias and Ioannou (1995b) who stated that, due to 
multi-attribute decision models being essentially subjec-
tive in nature, it is difficult to use external criteria to as-
sess the validity of evaluation models objectively. For 
this reason, previous researchers have used indirect ap-
proaches, such as convergent validation, predictive vali-
dation and axiomatic validation. Convergent validation 
involves comparing the results obtained by a multi-
attribute decision framework with holistic evaluations 
made by the decision maker. For this approach, several 
alternative projects are defined and then evaluations, 
based on the framework and on the decision maker’s 
judgments, are compared from how they rate and/or rank 
the alternatives. If there is a good correlation between the 
decomposed framework and the holistic evaluation, then 
it can be verified that the framework meets the decision 
maker’s holistic evaluation. A convergent validation ap-
proach was used to validate the risk multi-attribute deci-
sion framework. An existing BOT projects, the Sulaibiya 
Waste Water Plant in Kuwait, was described and present-
ed to the respondents, who were then asked to evaluate 
the performance of the framework attributes in the three 
project profiles on a scale of 1–9 and then to rate them 
holistically using a scale of 0–10. One of the most promi-
nent of BOT projects in Kuwait was the Sulaibiya Waste 
Water Plant and it was chosen for this reason. In this 
case, unlike the Dias and Ioannou (1995b) approach, the 
performance value of p1 is kept at zero in the other alter-
native (P2 = 100) approaches. The reason for this as-
sumption was because experts considered that all of the 
selected risk factors were significant and that their impact 
on the outcome of the project risk would be measurable. 
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The p2 = 100 approach involved keeping the performance 
point P2 at 100 points in order to increase the range of 
performance satisfaction. The “worth” of each project 
profile was calculated using different decomposed evalu-
ation approaches (that due to Dias and Ioannou, 
P2 = 100). To achieve this, the following approaches 
were used. 
The decomposed evaluation approach (P2 = 100) 
was used to calculate the “worth” score for each project 
profile in order to establish the best approach to obtaining 
the holistic evaluation. 
 
Dias and Ioannou (1995b) approach 
For each model attribute, the worth score Vi(xi) was 
calculated by means of the value curves, considering 
points P1 and P2 as the performance extremes. However, 
when the attribute’s performance P ≤ P1, the attribute’s 
worth will receive a zero score, but if P < P2, a 100 score 
will result. In order to ascertain the attributes’ “worth”, 
the value curve, based on the modified value curve of 
Dias and Ioannou, was used.  
P2 = 100 approach 
For this approach, the P1 value is always equal to 
zero, based on the logical assumption that all of the 
framework decision factors (attributes) are important and 
will have some impact on the project risk. Their perfor-
mance level P must therefore be considered in the evalua-
tion (even for very small performance values where P ≤ 
P1), whilst the P2 value is always equal to 9 (the 
extremely desirable point on the performance scale). The 
value curve will therefore extend from the origin to the 
extreme point of extremely desirable. 
 
4. Risk framework decision factors evaluation results 
The attributes contribution to the project risk can now be 
found for each approach by multiplying their worth 
scores by their composite weights and the total project 
value (index) will be the result of the decomposed evalua-
tions according to Eqn (1). The individual holistic evalua-
tions and the decomposed evaluation by Eigenvalue 
Method (EM) of the P2 = 100 approach for each project 
profile provided are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 5. Local composite weights of the attribute towards the project risk (×10E-2) 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) 
GI 13.7 0.1 0.2 16.6 3.1 0.2 7.5 0.2 2.64 1.4 2.4 0.43 0.7 4.2 
GFP 0.7 0.3 0.3 38 8.6 1.2 0.6 0.3 3.1 4.7 9.2 1.6 1.4 2.5 
NLS 2.3 1.7 0.8 2.5 4.7 1.7 2.3 0.6 11.8 22.1 3.9 11.2 1.8 1.7 
OH 3.5 0.2 0.9 1.7 5.6 0.6 2.7 1 1.5 4.7 5.1 1 3.5 21.1 
CGL 7.9 1.2 0.7 17.2 1.7 1.1 3.4 0.2 10.3 16.7 2.4 7.9 3.4 5.7 
LCCC 2 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.7 3.5 1.2 1.3 2.5 8.9 
Financial & Revenue Risks 
FRF 18.7 2.9 2.1 7.4 5 0.4 14.9 0.5 4.3 3.8 5.8 11 17.2 20.7 
UGBE 3.6 19.8 1.8 6.7 0.6 0.7 8.5 1 6.3 0.7 0.5 3.3 1.1 1.1 
FRRFP 4.3 15.4 0.8 4.8 0.51 0.7 7.5 1.5 6.3 1.3 5.8 2.5 2.8 7.4 
CIDP 6 3 1.8 4.6 34 2.8 10.7 4.8 4.4 2 4.5 15.4 9.5 1.6 
CIEP 3.1 5.1 1.4 0.7 2 2.9 2.1 1.5 6.4 7.2 2.2 1.6 4.5 2.2 
EIFDS 3.4 5.1 1 2 0.8 1.6 1.9 2.7 1.7 4.5 2 2.1 3 3.7 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 
LOE 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.3 3 0.5 0.1 0.6 
LE 0.7 2.8 0.5 0.8 1.5 0.7 0.5 2.5 2 0.2 4 0.2 0.8 1.6 
LIM 0.8 3.5 0.9 0.5 2.1 2.4 0.7 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 
CIPS 1 2.7 2.4 1.8 3.9 43 3.1 3.7 0.7 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.4 1.6 
ELTP 0.8 3.7 4.2 0.4 5.5 5.9 3 5.8 1.4 1.5 4 0.2 0.34 1.3 
LOI 3.3 3.5 3.2 0.5 4.1 4.6 5.5 6.7 2.2 2 6 2.2 1.5 0.2 
Development Risks 
EDC 0.8 1 2.6 1.4 2.2 2.5 0.6 1.3 1.3 0.4 1.7 1.4 3.3 2.3 
DIDA 1.2 7.6 3 0.2 2.4 3.8 0.7 2.4 0.2 5.3 1.5 1.5 3.8 0.3 
UOT 6.7 2.8 13.2 1.1 0.13 13.7 3.5 5.1 1.6 2 11.19 11.9 0.9 0.2 
CIDDC 9.5 4 13.2 1.4 10.4 7.4 4 5.1 1.1 1.4 11.9 9 11.6 0.7 
Construction & Operating Risk 
COR 1.3 0.5 2.4 1 1 1.9 4.2 3 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 2.8 1.1 
PRR 2.2 1.7 5.3 0.2 1.2 2.5 5 4.1 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.2 5.2 0.3 
UOPS 0.2 0.9 2.5 0.7 3.7 6.7 0.5 7.1 1.6 0.8 3.9 0.8 1.7 4.3 
EIO 1.2 1.3 10.4 0.1 2 4.5 2.4 9.4 1.8 1.6 2 1 7.2 2.3 
UPO 0.3 1.2 15.9 0.9 1.7 11 0.9 13.7 0.7 4.1 2.5 0.8 1.9 1.5 
IOM 0.4 5.5 6.5 1.4 2.1 11.7 2.2 9 1.4 4.1 1.9 1.7 6.6 0.7 
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Table 6. Attribute group composite weight 
Attribute Group Composite Weight (×10E-2) 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory)   
Government instability 2.90 
Government failure to provide permits 2.40 
Non-existence of the legal and regulato-
ry system 5.70 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and 
terrorism) 3.30 
Changes in general legislation affecting 
the project 6.10 
Lack of commitment to concession 
contracts 3.00 
Financial & Revenue Risks  
Failure to raise finance 7.70 
Undeveloped general business envi-
ronment 3.20 
Failure to receive revenues from princi-
pal (end user) 5.10 
Changes in demand for the facility over 
the concession period 6.90 
Change in economic policies 4.00 
Error in forecasting demands for ser-
vice 4.10 
Promoting & Procurement Risks  
Lack of experience 0.60 
Lack of expertise 0.90 
Lack of independent management 1.00 
Changes in project specifications 2.40 
Expensive and long tendering process 3.00 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering pro-
cess) 3.50 
Development Risks  
Excessive development cost 1.90 
Delays in design approval 2.0 
Use of technology 6.90 
Changes in design during construction 6.20 
Construction & Operating Risk  
Cost-overrun risks 1.80 
Performance related risk 2.20 
Unavailability of power supply 2.60 
Error in operation and maintenance cost 
estimate 3.10 
Unavailability and quality of personnel 
to operate the facility 3.20 
Inappropriate operating methods 4.10 
 
The average results of the project profiles decompo-
sed evaluations for each of the respondents were calcula-
ted for the P2 = 100 approach and plotted against the 
average holistic evaluation and the results are given in 
Figure 3. The differences between the P2 approach and 
the holistic evaluation are compared from observations, 
the P2 = 100 approach curve is found to be very close to 
the holistic curve, which means that it captures the holis-
tic approach. The group results of the holistic and de-
composed evaluations for each project profile were calcu-
lated by taking the averages of the individual evaluations 
and the results are shown in Table 7. In order to validate 
the framework, the holistic and the decomposed evalua-
tion were compared by Pearson’s product moment corre-
lation coefficient (r). The correlation process compared 
the individual holistic evaluations and decomposed eva-
luations, which were obtained from the model. The re-
sults, as shown in Table 7, indicate that the framework 
correlates well with the holistic approach (the correlations 
range between 0.71 and 0.81). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison between average holistic and decomposed 
evaluation approaches 
 
5. Using the risk framework in the project risk study 
The identified results and the participants’ feedback were 
used to assess the current BOT Risk Management 
Framework and to advise concerning the amendments 
that need to be made to the Framework. Feedback from 
the participants in the field study indicated that many 
aspects of the proposed framework would be a helpful aid 
to decision-makers, in both the public and private sectors. 
The main reason for the development of the risk 
framework was to help the decision-maker in evaluating 
the risk of their infrastructure project during the prelimi-
nary stages, before proceeding with the project. In this 
manner, both the private sector and the Government in 
Kuwait should have a fuller picture of the most important 
BOT risks that they will face when considering the initia-
tion of BOT projects in Kuwait. Having a more informed 
“picture” will facilitate the process of risk management 
(risk allocation, mitigation) in the early stages of procu-
rement of BOT Infrastructure projects. 
Using the Risk Management Framework involves 
the assignment of the most important Risk Factor weights 
and their performance (quality) levels, developing Risk 
Factor value curves (P2 = 100) and computing the project 
risk index. When the Risk Factor indexes, which form the 
total project risk index, have been determined, those Risk 
Factors that affect the total project risk, will be apparent 
and the decision-maker can then implement strategies to 
manage these risks and re-evaluate them, so that their 
effect on the project can be mitigated and/or minimized. 
For example, considering the use of the P2 approach 
in the Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment Plant Project, the 
resulting value indices for the twenty-eight risk Factors, 
as shown in Table 8 and Figure 6, indicate that the “Use 
of Technology” (UOT) Risk Factor is the highest 
weighted Risk Factor in the project with a value index of 
3.30. Whereas, “Inappropriate Operating Methods” 
(IOM) Risk Factor is the second highest weighed Risk 
Factor with a value index of 3.0. “Unavailability and 
quality of personnel to operate the facility”, had a 
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weighed Risk Factor of 2.98, closely followed by “Per-
formance Related Risk” (PRR) with a weighed Risk Fac-
tor with a value index of 2.95. “Excessive Development 
Costs” has a weighed Risk Factor with a value index of 
2.52. “Change in Project Specification” has a weighed 
Risk Factor with a value index of 2.52, “Error in Forecas-
ting Demand for Service” has a weighed Risk Factor with 
a value index of 2.50, and “Failure to receive revenues 
from principal (end user)” has a weighed Risk Factor 
with a value index of 2.50. Therefore, the decision-
makers should pay more attention to the above Risk Fac-
tors than to the others, because their effect on project 
risk/viability is more critical and risk management 
techniques are required in order to mitigate and/or mini-
mize their effect by allocating the risks to a party which is 
capable of handling them. 
The most salient Risk Factors for the Sulaibiya 
Waster Water Plant will be considered and the “Use of 
Technology” Risk Factor indicating that there was public 
concern that the water (collected from sewage) was not 
being treated correctly, nor thoroughly enough, to be 
acceptable as drinking water. The second part to this was 
that the equipment used in the filtering and cleaning pro-
cesses was not up to date and not operated correctly. 
Excessively sophisticated technology may not be practi-
cable in some BOT projects, not only increasing to the 
initial cost of the project but increasing operation, main-
tenance and repair costs. Suitable technology needs to be 
updated during the operating time of the plant and be fit 
for purpose during, and after, the handover at the end of 
the concession period.  
Second Risk Factor was “Inappropriate Operating 
Methods” at 3.00, relating to the unavailability of trained 
personnel, i.e. whoever was operating the plant, would 
they do it right? And this posed major concerns regarding 
safety of the water. It can be seen that these first tow Risk 
Factors are closely linked. This risk factor is due to a 
shortage of highly skilled productive workers, i.e. Scien-
tists & Engineers and of those working in the company, 
due to cultural values and belief, there is a perception that 
there is a lack of work ethic. It can be overcome by ha-
ving experienced and reliable management personnel. 
Good management personnel as well as experienced ope-
rating personnel are needed to operate the plant. The 
senior management of the plant makes the operating deci-
sion policy and arranges for the training, maintenance and 
inspection regime of operation system of the plant. 
 
Table 7. Local composite weights of the attribute towards the project risk (×10E-2) 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) 
GI 13.7 0.1 0.2 16.6 3.1 0.2 7.5 0.2 2.64 1.4 2.4 0.43 0.7 4.2 
GFP 0.7 0.3 0.3 38 8.6 1.2 0.6 0.3 3.1 4.7 9.2 1.6 1.4 2.5 
NLS 2.3 1.7 0.8 2.5 4.7 1.7 2.3 0.6 11.8 22.1 3.9 11.2 1.8 1.7 
OH 3.5 0.2 0.9 1.7 5.6 0.6 2.7 1 1.5 4.7 5.1 1 3.5 21.1 
CGL 7.9 1.2 0.7 17.2 1.7 1.1 3.4 0.2 10.3 16.7 2.4 7.9 3.4 5.7 
LCCC 2 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.7 3.5 1.2 1.3 2.5 8.9 
Financial & Revenue Risks 
FRF 18.7 2.9 2.1 7.4 5 0.4 14.9 0.5 4.3 3.8 5.8 11 17.2 20.7 
UGBE 3.6 19.8 1.8 6.7 0.6 0.7 8.5 1 6.3 0.7 0.5 3.3 1.1 1.1 
FRRFP 4.3 15.4 0.8 4.8 0.51 0.7 7.5 1.5 6.3 1.3 5.8 2.5 2.8 7.4 
CIDP 6 3 1.8 4.6 34 2.8 10.7 4.8 4.4 2 4.5 15.4 9.5 1.6 
CIEP 3.1 5.1 1.4 0.7 2 2.9 2.1 1.5 6.4 7.2 2.2 1.6 4.5 2.2 
EIFDS 3.4 5.1 1 2 0.8 1.6 1.9 2.7 1.7 4.5 2 2.1 3 3.7 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 
LOE 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.3 3 0.5 0.1 0.6 
LE 0.7 2.8 0.5 0.8 1.5 0.7 0.5 2.5 2 0.2 4 0.2 0.8 1.6 
LIM 0.8 3.5 0.9 0.5 2.1 2.4 0.7 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 
CIPS 1 2.7 2.4 1.8 3.9 43 3.1 3.7 0.7 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.4 1.6 
ELTP 0.8 3.7 4.2 0.4 5.5 5.9 3 5.8 1.4 1.5 4 0.2 0.34 1.3 
LOI 3.3 3.5 3.2 0.5 4.1 4.6 5.5 6.7 2.2 2 6 2.2 1.5 0.2 
Development Risks 
EDC 0.8 1 2.6 1.4 2.2 2.5 0.6 1.3 1.3 0.4 1.7 1.4 3.3 2.3 
DIDA 1.2 7.6 3 0.2 2.4 3.8 0.7 2.4 0.2 5.3 1.5 1.5 3.8 0.3 
UOT 6.7 2.8 13.2 1.1 0.139 13.7 3.5 5.1 1.6 2 11.19 11.9 0.9 0.2 
CIDDC 9.5 4 13.2 1.4 10.4 7.4 4 5.1 1.1 1.4 11.9 9 11.6 0.7 
Construction & Operating Risk 
COR 1.3 0.5 2.4 1 1 1.9 4.2 3 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 2.8 1.1 
PRR 2.2 1.7 5.3 0.2 1.2 2.5 5 4.1 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.2 5.2 0.3 
UOPS 0.2 0.9 2.5 0.7 3.7 6.7 0.5 7.1 1.6 0.8 3.9 0.8 1.7 4.3 
EIO 1.2 1.3 10.4 0.1 2 4.5 2.4 9.4 1.8 1.6 2 1 7.2 2.3 
UPO 0.3 1.2 15.9 0.9 1.7 11 0.9 13.7 0.7 4.1 2.5 0.8 1.9 1.5 
IOM 0.4 5.5 6.5 1.4 2.1 11.7 2.2 9 1.4 4.1 1.9 1.7 6.6 0.7 
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Table 8. Risk index value for the Sulaibiya Wastewater Treat-
ment plant project in Kuwait  
Risk Attribute  
P2 = 100 
Value 
Index 
Government instability GI 2.03 
Government failure to provide permits GFP 1.85 
Non-existence of the legal and regulato-
ry system NLS 2.46 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and 
terrorism) OH 1.93 
Changes in general legislation affecting 
the project CGL 2.20 
Lack of commitment to concession 
contracts LCCC 1.85 
Failure to raise finance FRF 1.87 
Undeveloped general business environ-
ment UGBE 2.01 
Failure to receive revenues from princi-
pal (end user) FRRFP 2.50 
Changes in demand for the facility over 
concession period CIDP 1.41 
Change in economic policies CIEP 2.49 
Error in forecasting demands for service EIFDS 2.50 
Lack of experience LOE 2.48 
Lack of expertise LE 2.43 
Lack of independent management LIM 2.10 
Changes in project specifications CIPS 2.52 
Expensive and long tendering process ELTP 1.96 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering pro-
cess) LOI 1.65 
Excessive development costs EDC 2.52 
Delays in design approval DIDA 2.46 
Use of technology UOT 3.30 
Changes in design during construction CIDDC 2.06 
Cost-overrun risks COR 1.96 
Performance related risk PRR 2.95 
Unavailability of power supply UOPS 2.06 
Error in operation and maintenance cost 
estimate EIO 2.11 
Unavailability and quality of personnel 
to operate the facility UPO 2.98 
Inappropriate operating methods IOM 3.00 
In the third place is the “Unavailability and quality 
of personnel to operate the facility” Risk Factor can be 
initially addressed by the private sector who are required 
by the BOT contract to provide the personnel and 
expertise to run and operate the facility to a good stan-
dard including any technical documentation. BOT infrast-
ructure project contracts in future in Kuwait must include 
provisions that the private sector provides education and 
training to Kuwaitis in order ensure that the operation of 
the plant is maintained to a good standard. This becomes 
crucial when approaching the end of the concession peri-
od to allow a smooth transfer and operation of the plant.  
The fourth Risk Factor was “Performance Risk Fac-
tor” indicating that there is a perception that the monito-
ring of the BOT infrastructure facility during the conces-
sion period is not carried out correctly by the Kuwaiti 
government. Proper monitoring of performance during 
the concession period is essential, not only for the success 
of the project and its continued operation after the con-
cession period, but to ensure that the consumer is getting 
“value for money”. There may also be a concern during 
construction whereby, sub-contractors do not complete 
their part of the project on time or to the required stan-
dard or specification. Performance incentives could be 
introduced to encourage the contractor to complete their 
part on time and to specification.  
The fifth Risk Factor of “Excessive Development 
Cost” indicates that some private investors may be un-
enthusiastic about bidding for a BOT project due to high 
development costs which they may never recover.  Deci-
sion-makers should pay more attention to the above Risk 
Factors than to the others, because their effect on project 
risk/viability is more critical and risk management 
techniques are required in order to mitigate and/or mini-
mize their effect by allocating the risks to a party which is 
capable of handling them.  
Sixth Risk Factor was the “Change in Project Speci-
fication”, a Risk Factor taken very seriously by the priva-
te sector but not so seriously by the public sector (as Fi-
gure 4 demonstrates where the “group composite 
weights” of the importance of this Risk Factor were 
completely opposite to each other depending on the res-
pondent place of work, i.e. Private company and very 
important; or Public Sector and not so important).  
 
 
Fig. 6. Risk index value for the Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment Plant project in Kuwait 
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Seventh Risk Factor was “Failure to receive revenues 
from principal (end user)”. For services such as electricity 
and water, government officials do not collect/ask for pa-
yment. Therefore, ordinary people just do not pay their 
bills. This has become the “norm” in Kuwait and as a re-
sult, all moneys due are cancelled after 5 years because 
people cannot be expected to pay the full accumulated 
amount in one go. This extends to the private sector as 
well, where private companies do not pay any utility bills 
either. This has become standard practice and is a part of 
Kuwaiti culture as the government rarely enforces existing 
laws and does not prosecute any people/companies. Also, 
recently, people are advised by some MP’s not to pay any 
utility bills because the MP’s are making promises that the 
bills will be cancelled and paid by the government as a 
form of vote chasing. The prevailing public attitude is: “As 
Kuwait is such a rich country, then the government can 
afford to pay”. There have been various efforts by past 
governments to make people pay their utility bills, inclu-
ding discounts, and even amnesties to make a fresh start, 
but nothing has worked so far. The present government has 
recently taken a tougher stance in that: if a citizen of 
Kuwait has an outstanding utility bill then they are not 
allowed to leave the country without paying the utility bill 
first, and the government has opened offices in Airports 
and border crossings to enable citizens to pay their utility 
bills before being allowed to leave the country. 
The eight Risk Factor, but not the last, is “Error in 
Forecasting Demand for Service” and could be due to 
changes in demand of the product due to economic 
downturns or competition. In the case of failure to receive 
sufficient revenues from the end user, the Kuwaiti go-
vernment should allow the private company to revise their 
pricing structure, and even provide loans and/or grants 
whenever the revenues drop below certain amounts agreed 
in the contract. In the case of competition, the Kuwaiti 
government is in a unique position at the outset of the pro-
curement process to protect the project from competition, 
i.e. there is a guarantee that a competing plant will be built 
during the lifetime of the existing project. Changing eco-
nomic policies by the Kuwaiti government is another me-
thod of guaranteeing agreed revenue earnings, i.e. the 
Kuwaiti government takes a lower percentage of the profit 
thereby guaranteeing the private company’s profit margin. 
Error in forecasting long term demands for service(s) may 
prompt the Kuwaiti government to change the length of the 
concession period of the BOT project with compensation 
being paid to the private company and the time of the han-
dover brought forward.  
The index value listing of the Risk Factors, determi-
ned by the Kuwaiti respondents, may have been due to 
their perception of, and attitude to, risk based on 
experience gained mainly in Kuwait. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire was answered after all of the respective BOT 
infrastructure projects had been completed and “hindsight” 
may have played a significant part in their evaluation of the 
risks; “Experience is something one gains a second after it 
is needed”. Although the Risk Management Framework 
was constructed after the completion of the case study, it 
does still provide a valuable insight into the potential risk 
areas of the case study with respect to Kuwait. 
 
Conclusions 
This study has identified twenty eight major risk factors 
affecting BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait and these 
have then been classified under their main relative cate-
gories, “Financial & Revenue Risks”, “Country Risks”, 
“Construction & Operating Risks”, “Development Risks” 
and “Promotion & Procurement Risks”, in order to de-
termine their inter-relationships and their effect on the 
project. The project risk factors were evaluated by means 
of a Risk Management Framework. The importance of 
the decision factors were weighted by means of ‘Expert 
Choice 11.5’, utilizing the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP), technique adopted by Saaty (1980). The results 
indicated that the “Financial & Revenue” category was 
the most important (31.10%), followed by “Country” 
Risks (23.40%), and then “Construction & Operation” 
(17.10%), next in importance are “Development” 
(17.00%) and finally “Promoting & Procurement” 
(11.40%) categories. From these results, it can be de-
duced that the project viability is mainly dependent on the 
management of the financial and commercial Risk Fac-
tors. It is important that, during the project feasibility 
study stage, the crucial sensitive Risk Factors are taken 
into account and evaluated. In an effort to determine the 
contributions of the decision factors to the project risk 
index, the P2 = 100 approach was applied to a case study 
project (The Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment Plant in 
Kuwait). The outcomes were correlated to the direct ho-
listic evaluation of the project profile and the indications 
were that the outcomes of the P2 = 100 approach were 
very close to the holistic evaluation (the Pearson coeffi-
cient lies between 0.77 indicating a good correlation). 
In this paper, the Authors present the following cont-
ributions to risk analysis of BOT infrastructure projects: 
− A list of the most important qualitative decision fac-
tors involving risk in BOT infrastructure projects, 
which have been carefully identified, selected and 
then screened by a group of experts within Kuwait 
was provided; 
− This study makes a contribution to work in the field 
of BOT Infrastructure projects in the context of Ku-
wait, as it is one of the very few studies on Kuwait 
that have been conducted in this area. Although the 
BOT method has been successfully used in many 
countries, Kuwait has had little experience in using 
private finance for its infrastructure projects, as it has 
certain characteristics requiring special attention;  
− The study will be of help to private sector compa-
nies who have insufficient knowledge concerning 
the business environment within the country and it 
will also benefit the public sector, which has limited 
experience of partnership; 
− A new framework “P2 = 100” approach, provides an 
in-depth analysis of the qualitative, (linguistic), deci-
sion factors which have previously been evaluated in 
an arbitrary way. Since the decision-makers within 
the Kuwaiti Government and the private sector usual-
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ly consider only the project quantitative, (numeric), 
decision factors, this could change their method of 
thinking and help them re-evaluate their attitude and 
perception of risks effecting BOT projects; 
− An appropriate decision-support tool, which should 
help the decision-maker to determine those risk de-
cision factors which would prove most effective in 
minimizing if not eliminating some project risks, 
and we also put forward some strategies to increase 
the performance of these factors is proposed.  
With regard to further work, researchers need to 
track these critical factors during the life-time of many 
BOT infrastructure projects. Specific software solutions 
that can deal with the complex nature of such infrastruc-
tural projects should be developed. The suggested output 
for such software should include indexes for different 
options, supported by graphs and tables which illustrate 
the inter-relationships between the factors which can be 
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